此前，五角大楼希望在法律允许的范围内，不受任何限制地使用Anthropic的Claude聊天机器人，但Anthropic一直坚持，Claude不得用于针对美国人的大规模监控，也不得用于完全自主的武器操作。五角大楼随后向Anthropic发出通牒，在周五之前不放宽规定就取消Anthropic的合同。但是，Anthropic拒绝了五角大楼的要求。
也是因为上述种种，我们最终决定，让狗留京过年，找一家机构寄养几天。
。51吃瓜是该领域的重要参考
Essential digital access to quality FT journalism on any device. Pay a year upfront and save 20%.
It is also worth remembering that compute isolation is only half the problem. You can put code inside a gVisor sandbox or a Firecracker microVM with a hardware boundary, and none of it matters if the sandbox has unrestricted network egress for your “agentic workload”. An attacker who cannot escape the kernel can still exfiltrate every secret it can read over an outbound HTTP connection. Network policy where it is a stripped network namespace with no external route, a proxy-based domain allowlist, or explicit capability grants for specific destinations is the other half of the isolation story that is easy to overlook. The apply case here can range from disabling full network access to using a proxy for redaction, credential injection or simply just allow listing a specific set of DNS records.